Is the EMU ready for future shocks? An overview of available backstops. European Policy Brief No. 20, March 2014 by Bosch, Xavier Vanden
  
 





Is the EMU ready for future shocks? An 
overview of available backstops 
Xavier Vanden Bosch 
 
 
Since 2008, different financial backstops have 
gradually been introduced to better cope with 
the economic crisis. These backstops have 
ensured enough flexibility to prevent the EMU 
from breaking down in the aftermath of a 
sovereign debt crisis, a large scale default in the 
banking sector, a severe disruption in the 
payment system or in flows of capital in the 
eurozone. 
This contribution explores how the EMU can 
cope with present and future economic shocks 
given its present architecture. First to be 
addressed: the framework gradually put into 
place for the backstops from the beginning of 
the crisis onward. This will be followed by some 
general – but certainly far from exhaustive – 
comments on their adequacy, with particular 
focus on the governance, rationale and possible 
shortcomings of the instruments available. 
AN OVERVIEW 
Table 1 (page 2) provides an overview of the 
backstops put in place to deal with the different 
– but interconnected – dimensions of the crisis 
affecting the eurozone. The crisis is broken 
down into three types of event: (i) banking crises 
that are often tied to prolonged periods of 
excessive credit growth and/or asset bubbles; (ii) 
fiscal or sovereign-debt crises originating with 
fiscal imbalances; and (iii) balance-of-payment 
crises linked to current account imbalances or 
sudden stops but usually associated with 
banking or sovereign debt crises.1 This 
breakdown of the crisis is far more blurred than 
the reality but allows for a simple overview.  
In recent years much has been 
accomplished to make the EMU more 
resilient to banking crises, sovereign-
debt crises or balance-of-payment crises. 
Several ‘backstops’ or financial safety 
nets were progressively put in place to 
absorb the shocks that could have 
otherwise broken the EMU as a system. 
These substantial advances reflected a 
gradual, trial-and-error approach rather 
than a grand design that would have 
completely overhauled the EMU 
architecture. While flexibility and 
realism have advantages, complacency 
is a clear risk. With no roadmap to 
follow, efforts to complete the 
architecture of the EMU may fade with 
time. Maintaining a sense of direction is 








A distinction is also drawn between liquidity and 
solvency crises. Caution is also warranted 
because it is extremely difficult to distinguish in 
practice between liquidity and solvency issues. 
Both are connected, as liquidity crises typically 
relate to some solvency concern. Moreover, 
mismanaged liquidity issues easily morph into 
solvency problems. This categorization is mostly 
useful because the backstops themselves are 
often designed in principle to address one or 
other issue separately.  
BANKING CRISIS BACKSTOPS 
The eurozone’s capacity to deal with a shock to 
its banking sector is not merely theoretical. The 
ECB comprehensive assessment that will be 
performed in 2014 will include a stress test – in 
essence a simulation of a shock. The exercise is 
not only preventive but also corrective in nature. 
It should promote the transformation of the 
European banking sector by fostering 
recapitalization and the resolution of banks that 
fail to meet capital requirements. One key 
question revolves around the actual 
recapitalization needs of the banking sector and 
the available absorption capacity of resolution 
tools – financial markets, the banks themselves 
(via bail-ins), the Single Resolution Fund (SRF) 
and existing public backstops. 
For many observers at this stage of negotiations, 
the Single Resolution Mechanism’s (SRM) 
design is unsatisfactory because its decision-
making process is too complex and the 
resolution fund lacks a common fiscal backstop. 
As a result, many fear this setup will not allow 
the ECB to be sufficiently bold in its 
forthcoming assessment.  
Although the decision-making process on the 
resolution of banks is rather complex and 
ultimately lies in the hands of finance ministers, 
it could nonetheless be workable. The 
governance balances technocracy (the Single 
Resolution Board and the Commission) with 
  
 




politics (ECOFIN). If the SRM does indeed fall 
short of being a true, ‘single’ authority 
functioning as an agency, this setup should 
nonetheless make it possible to take prompt 
decisions when required. Given that national 
fiscal resources would be on the line in the short 
term, it seems unrealistic to grant exclusive 
authority to the Commission and the Board for 
now. The governance of the ESM, which may 
also be required to take urgent decisions, 
actually presents stronger intergovernmentalist 
limits.  
The second major concern is that the Banking 
Union would lack a proper common fiscal 
backstop. The vicious circle between banks and 
sovereigns would be reinforced by the absence 
of common risk-sharing mechanisms.  However, 
the main focus of the ECB exercise should be 
the restructuring of unviable banks that present 
structural profitability problems. And solvency 
problems should not be dealt with using bailouts 
(which require fiscal backstops). If capital 
shortfalls are detected, then banks will be 
required to raise capital. But failure to raise 
capital above the current regulatory minimum2 
would in principle imply that the bank’s 
fundamentals are lacking, indicating insolvency. 
In this case, before any public support can be 
granted, a restructuring plan would first have to 
be submitted to the Commission specifying how 
bail-in measures would limit the aid to a 
minimum.3 The bail-in’s priorities would be 
equity then subordinated debt, possibly followed 
by senior debt – unless the Commission 
estimates that the shortfall is so substantial that 
it could cause a disruption of financial stability.  
There is much uncertainty regarding the precise 
recapitalization needs of the banking system in 
Europe because many questions remain open 
regarding the exact parameters the ECB will use 
when it conducts its assessment.4 It is thus 
difficult to judge how much public funding may 
ultimately be necessary. In the short term and 
before the SRF reaches a considerable size, the 
available private resources may be insufficient. If 
so, the ultimate backstop will remain national 
taxpayers. This does not, however, preclude the 
ESM stepping in as a common backstop by 
making use of its direct bank recapitalization 
instrument to share a part of the burden if it 
becomes too great for the sovereign.5 
While it falls short of an ideal design, this 
transitory resolution setup may be workable. 
The EMU will have to rely on the executive 
boldness of the ECB, which will hopefully act as 
a strong supervisor. In the longer term, 
especially when the banking system is hopefully 
brought back to health, the governance and 
fiscal backstops of the Banking Union could be 
improved to better deal with future crises. 
SOVEREIGN-DEBT CRISIS BACKSTOPS 
For a (pure) liquidity crisis – the ECB’s 
Outright Monetary Transactions 
 
Liquidity issues attracted much attention at the 
height of the sovereign debt crisis when several 
countries experienced the rapid and seemingly 
contagious rise of their borrowing costs. Some 
economists argued that a self-fulfilling liquidity 
crisis was underway as the market speculated 
about the possible break up of the eurozone.  
Initially, Eurobonds were discussed as a possible 
means to halt the contagion. In essence, a 
country would be able to borrow via Eurobonds  
or debt issuances benefiting from the shared 
guarantees of all other eurozone members. 
Numerous proposals were voiced, with none 
actually making it to the negotiation table.6 
Technically, Eurobonds proposals were 
probably ill-suited to addressing strict liquidity 
issues.7 Their introduction may not have halted 
the self-fulfilling liquidity crisis dynamic. The 
limit set on the amount of debt that could be 
issued via Eurobonds may have offered a clear 
target for speculation. Moreover, once 
  
 




introduced, Eurobonds would have at best 
allowed a country to borrow under its market 
rate and thereby raised severe moral hazard 
concerns, or at worst been inefficient if the 
overall sovereign risk was transferred to its 
remaining national issuances. 
Because Eurobonds were technically and 
politically questionable, the solution had to 
come from the ECB which – despite political 
tension about its statute – was a more obvious 
candidate for eurozone lender-of-last-resort. As 
it turned out, the mere announcement by the 
ECB in summer 2012 that it would ‘do whatever 
it takes to save the euro,’ which it concretized 
via the creation of the Outright Monetary 
Transactions (OMT) programme, has for now 
effectively managed to halt speculation about an 
imminent euro break up. Since the ECB has 
endorsed this lender-of-last-resort role, the 
refinancing conditions of countries under the 
most severe stress have eased considerably.  
However, the governance of this backstop for 
sovereigns remains flawed.8 In principle, a 
lender of last resort should be able to act on an 
unlimited and unconditional basis. While 
essentially unlimited, the ECB intervention is 
not unconditional. A country facing refinancing 
difficulties must first request precautionary 
assistance in the form of a credit line from the 
ESM. 
A Memorandum of Understanding and a 
Financial Assistance Agreement would set the 
conditionality of potential ECB interventions. 
These conditions would have to be negotiated 
among eurozone finance ministers who 
ultimately hold the key to the door leading to 
potential purchases by the ECB. This may not 
be a smooth process to undertake in the midst 
of a crisis, when distinguishing liquidity issues 
from solvency issues would be extremely 
difficult. Germany holds a veto right in the ESM 
Governing Council and would, in particular, 
need to take a further stance from the 
Bundesbank, which opposes the very concept of 
the OMT. The negative judgment of the 
German Federal Constitutional Court on the 
OMT in February 2014 added another 
complication. The increasing uncertainty may 
moreover represent a significant stigma for any 
ailing eurozone country making a request in the 
first place.  
A similar judgment than for the Banking 
Union’s backstops may apply here. The 
decision-making is certainly not ideal and 
involves some risks, but remains workable as 
long as stakeholders cooperate. In a longer term 
perspective, this improvised patchwork should 
be turned into a more robust solution. 
From liquidity to solvency crisis – ESM 
programme and debt restructuring 
Ensuring countries’ solvency – i.e., the 
sustainability of public finances – will remain a 
key challenge for many years to come in the 
EMU. With aggregate eurozone public debt 
levels currently above 95% of GDP, public 
deleveraging will require continuous effort. 
Therefore considerable attention was devoted in 
recent years to strengthening fiscal discipline in 
the EMU. 
In principle, as long a eurozone member 
complies with the European fiscal governance 
framework, it could benefit from the ESM’s 
support if it face an adverse shock that 
destabilizes its public finances. This could in 
particular be the case following a banking crisis. 
However, contrary to the earliest phase of the 
crisis, the common backstop will probably not 
be first in line in the future. Some form of debt 
restructuring would be in order when mostly 
solvency rather than liquidity issues are involved. 
The ESM Treaty explicitly foresees the 
possibility of private-sector restructuring should 
a future debt sustainability analysis show that the 
country cannot service its debt in full. Collective 
action clauses in sovereign bonds contracts were 
  
 




made mandatory to facilitate such restructuring. 
Moreover, for large eurozone countries, a full 
bailout would anyway be inconceivable due to 
the limited size of the ESM. Finally, the 
European banking sector is, for the time being, 
greatly fragmented, with a strong ‘home bias’ for 
sovereign debt. Despite the downside of this 
fragmentation, it would greatly facilitate the 
parallel restructuring of both a national banking 
sector and sovereign debt because it limits 
contagion effects.  
However, in a prolonged low-growth and low-
inflation context, the reduction of debt levels 
relies on a long-term commitment to fiscal 
consolidation.  This will involve important 
redistribution issues at national level. In extreme 
instances, the high level of debt and the burden 
imposed on young and future generations may 
be judged excessive and illegitimate. If national 
social and political forces intend to take more 
radical measures to reduce the national stock of 
debt by restructuring it instead of relying on 
fiscal consolidation only, the eurozone would 
enter into uncharted territory.  
BALANCE-OF-PAYMENT CRISIS 
BACKSTOPS  
The extent to which the euro crisis qualifies as a 
balance-of-payment crisis is debatable. It may in 
particular be argued that the imbalances 
affecting the eurozone merely reflect the other 
dimensions of the crisis – in particular the 
banking crisis. Accordingly, the backstops for 
balance-of-payment crises overlap the ones that 
exist for banks and sovereigns (see Table 1). 
Indeed, the major backstop that mitigated 
sudden capital outflows was public inflow – 
especially eurosystem refinancing, i.e., central 
bank liquidity.9 This rightly shows that the 
solution of banking sector issues is the priority 
for unwinding exceptional liquidity provisions, 
fostering financial (re)integration,  and ultimately 
allowing private flow back to the eurozone 
countries most negatively affected by the 
imbalances.  
However, next to banking issues, 
competitiveness imbalances also represent a 
challenge. The macroeconomic imbalance 
procedure introduced in 2011 as part of the 
strengthened European economic governance 
framework reflects this concern. The excessive 
wage and price inflation that followed the 
introduction of the euro significantly explained 
the deterioration in the competitiveness of 
crisis-hit economies. This would call for a 
significant ‘competitive devaluation’ or ‘relative 
disinflation’ backed by the necessary product 
and market reforms.  
Yet such an adjustment bears potential social 
costs for which no backstop other than the 
strictly national ones exists. A currency 
devaluation (or a eurozone exit) could have 
performed this absorption function but within 
the eurozone no such flexibility exists. As a 
result, no common instrument is currently 
available to mitigate the cost of the necessary 
adjustment following the shock that sudden 
stops imply. Addressing this void would involve 
developing instruments that would be part of a 
fiscal union. Yet proposals for a fiscal union – 
conceived as building block towards a 
‘complete’, ‘genuine’ EMU – have so far largely 
been sidelined. 
In particular, a mutual insurance mechanism 
could help absorb shocks and smooth out 
business cycles. However, any scheme involving 
automatic insurance against adverse shock will 
be extremely difficult to implement at this stage. 
The insurance mechanism would create moral 
hazard issues and its automaticity would make 
the conditionality of the transfers difficult to 
establish. Many fear that supposedly temporary 
automatic transfers may actually become 
permanent. An insurance mechanism is also best 
put in place under a veil of ignorance, when 
risks are perceived to be nearly equal for all 
  
 




countries, and their realization a distant, 
uncertain prospect. In the current situation – 
with the ongoing crisis unresolved – risks have 
already materialized as shocks for several 
countries. An unwinding of the accumulated 
competitiveness imbalances therefore seems to 
be a prerequisite. 
In order to promote long-term convergence, the 
eurozone may still need a financial instrument 
that would both facilitate the correction of the 
imbalances – rather than focusing solely on their 
prevention – and mitigate the shock experienced 
by the countries most hit by the crisis. The 
ongoing discussion on contractual arrangements 
offers such an opportunity.10 Contracting 
countries committing to structural reforms 
advocated by the EU would benefit from a 
limited, timely, targeted and temporary transfer 
scheme. There would be – by design – no moral 
hazard issue since contractual arrangements 
would be calculated to speed up and not slow 
down the adjustment process (these are 
contracts and not insurance policies, which 
would involve close monitoring).  Selected 
recipient countries would thereby be 
contractually bound to implement the labour- 
and product-market reforms that aim to 
facilitate the adjustment necessary for their own 
sake but also for the EMU as a whole. The 
financial support for the necessary adjustment 
phase required in some countries could mitigate 
some of the social and political costs involved in 
their competitive adjustment process. 
Quite obviously, the financial support attached 
to contractual arrangements will not match the 
benefit of restoring normal lending conditions 
and reversing financial fragmentation in the 
eurozone. Therefore a functioning banking 
union remains the top priority. Yet these 
targeted and timely public transfers could be a 
useful complement in the short term – say five 
years – by the time the most pressing 
competitiveness and banking issues are 
addressed. The experience gained with this 
mechanism could then possibly serve as a basis 
for more ambitious shock absorption schemes 
as part of a fiscal union. 
CONCLUSION 
In recent years, much has been accomplished to 
make the EMU more resilient to crises. Several 
backstops were progressively put in place to 
absorb the shocks that could otherwise have 
broken the EMU as a system.  
In the banking sector, the ECB ensured 
sufficient liquidity was made available to 
financial institutions. For more severe solvency 
issues, the forthcoming establishment of a Single 
Resolution Mechanism along with new bail-in 
principles should allow the ECB to effectively 
reinforce its central role in bringing the banking 
sector back to health. A Single Resolution Fund 
will be gradually built up. In the short term, the 
fiscal backstop will remain national but the ESM 
could also be used to directly recapitalize banks 
if necessary. Regarding sovereign debt risks, the 
ECB’s OMT in combination with the ESM can 
fend off the most severe self-fulfilling liquidity 
risks. The ESM may be used in the event of a 
sovereign debt crisis, but, contrary to earlier 
bailouts, future ESM programmes would 
probably involve debt restructuring with Private 
Sector Involvement.  
These substantial advances followed a gradual, 
trial-and-error approach rather than a grand 
design that would have completely overhauled 
the EMU architecture. While flexibility and 
realism have advantages, complacency is a clear 
risk. With no roadmap to follow, efforts to 
complete the architecture of the EMU may fade 
with time. Maintaining a sense of direction is 
crucial while potential vulnerabilities remain.  
Some of these vulnerabilities are associated with 
the governance of the backstops. It is 
  
 




understandable that Member States are not 
willing to concede strong executive powers at 
EU level. Yet these are necessary for most of 
the backstops. The fact that the ECB, which 
disposes of strong executive powers, manages 
several of the backstops in the EMU is no 
coincidence. It’s risky to involve high-level 
politics in decisions on the resolution of banks, 
or to authorize the ECB to purchase sovereign 
bonds. Moreover, a comprehensive backstop to 
the Banking Union’s common resolution fund is 
desirable. The greatest question mark remains 
over the desirability of a fiscal union in the 
EMU. While the crisis triggered the creation of 
backstops for banks and sovereigns, no 
European mechanism directly mitigates the 
social cost implied by the adjustment process in 
eurozone countries most hit by the crisis. 
Contractual arrangements – presented as a 
building block towards such a fiscal union – are 
the only elements still on the European Council 
agenda, and the debate should integrate this 
dimension. 
Overall, the current EMU backstop framework 
is not ideal but is workable. Different backstops 
exist and many instruments can be quickly 
expanded if necessary. However, this risk 
management exercise must be pursued by 
considering all risks and available options and by 
learning from past mistakes. The overarching 
objective should be to increase the EMU’s 
resilience in all possible dimensions.  
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1 The definition is from – and the (updated) associated table is inspired by – Bijlsma, M., Vallée, S., (2012), ‘The 
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Bruegel policy brief, Issue 2010/03), the European Redemption fund proposal (German Council of Economic 
Expert, (2011) ‘Euro area in crisis, Annual report 2011/12’, annual report of GCEE, chapter 3), the Eurobills 
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S.,Mody, A., Vallee, S., (2012), ‘Paths to Eurobonds’, Bruegel Working Paper, 2012/10. 
 
7 We are not discussing here the merits of other forms of Eurobonds conceived as debt instrument backed by a 
genuine eurozone fiscal capacity. Preventing contagion and self-fulfilling liquidity crises was the core rationale 
for Eurobonds based on shared guarantees. 
 
8 What follows is a summary of the argumentation made in Vanden Bosch, X. (2012), ‘Preventing the rise of 
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 Which explains Target 2 imbalances. See Merler, S., Pisani-Ferry, J., (2012), ‘Sudden stops in the euro area’, 
Bruegel Policy Contribution, Issue 2012/06, March 2012. 
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 This possibility is explored in Vanden Bosch, X. (2013), ‘Contractual arrangements: the overlooked step 
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